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Abstract 
 
 
 
Not surprisingly, freedom is one of the central concepts in moral and 
political philosophy. After Amartya Sen's celebrated work "The Impossibility of 
A Paretian Liberal", a massive literature emerged over the last three decades. 
This study mainly describes how various authors contributed to this literature 
and tries to incorporate the importance of "description" in individual oriented 
problems of Social Choice Theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Özetçe 
 
 
 
Özgürlük kavramı yıllar boyunca ahlaki ve politik felsefenin önemli bir 
ilgi alanı olmuştur. Amartya Sen’in “The Impossibility of A Paretian Liberal” 
makalesiyle birlikte bu alanda pek çok çalışma hızla ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu 
çalışma temel olarak “özgürlük” hakkındaki makaleleri özetlemek ve Sosyal 
Seçim Teorisi icinde “tanımlama”nın önemini vurgulamak için yazılmıştır. 
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Abstract
Not surprisingly, freedom is one of the central concepts in moral and po-
litical philosophy. After Amartya Sen’s celebrated work "The Impossibility
of A Paretian Liberal", a massive literature emerged over the last three
decades. This study mainly describes how various authors contributed to
this literature and tries to incorporate the importance of "description" in
individual oriented problems of Social Choice Theory.
1. Section I
1.1. Introduction
Not surprisingly, freedom is one of the central concepts in moral and political
philosophy. Indeed, among philosophers there have been many debates over the
nature and the value of the freedom.1 Philosophical discussions concerning the
nature of freedom revolve around three issues; viz. deciding what kinds of agents,
what kinds of constraints and what kinds of objectives should be considered rel-
evant 2. Or in another words, “Concepts of freedom diﬀer in terms of who can
be said to be free, the specification of what the agents are free from, or the views
about what the agents are free or not-free to do or be or become” 3. Standard
introductions to the philosophical study of freedom state that there are many dif-
ferent views on what freedom refers to. Gray (1991), for instance, distinguishes at
least seven clusters of concepts of freedom: concepts according to which freedom
refers to the absence of impediments, the availability of choices, eﬀective power,
status, self-determination, doing what one wants, or self-mastery. Martin Van
1For important post-war contributions, see Hayek 1960; Oppenheim 1961, 1981; MacCallum
1967; Berlin 1969; Rawls 1971; Nozick 1974; Day 1977, 1983; Gewirth 1978, Taylor 1979; Miller
1983; Raz 1986; Hurka 1987; Kymlicka 1989; Swanton 1992; Steiner 1994; Van Parijs 1995;
Kristjánsson 1996; Carter 1999; Pettit 1997, 2001; Kramer 2003
2Please see MacCallum (1967)
3Please see Van Hees (2004)
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Hees (2004) continues with examples:
“In addition, many further diﬀerences concerning the exact def-
inition of freedom can be distinguished within a single cluster. For
instance, let freedom refers to the absence of impediments to a per-
son’s behavior. Immediately after, debates in this view centers on the
exact nature of the constraints or impediments that determine a per-
son’s freedom. Are only “human-imposed” impediments to count as
freedom reducing, or do natural or physical constraints also count? Is
a violation of a person’s freedom, by humans, always the result of an
intentionally imposed constraint, or do unintentionally imposed con-
straints also limit a person’s freedom? Do only morally inadmissible
constraints curtail freedom or do morally acceptable ones do so too?”
Another substantial part of the freedom literature concerns the question of why
freedom is valuable. A well-known argument is that freedom has an important
instrumental value since it enables us to do what we want; it enables us to realize
our preferences better. However it may be possible for some particular cases that
freedom may not contribute to the happiness of the “free” individuals. If such a
case occurs, is this means freedom should be restricted? Or, what if one person’s
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freedom aﬀects that of another? Is it possible to compare freedom degrees of
diﬀerent individuals? Can we compare the respective values of these freedoms, and
if so, how? These are some basic questions of the moral and political philosophy
related to freedom.
Although there is not a pure agreement in the literature, it has been accepted
that there is a clear dependency between “the nature” and “the value” of freedom.
“A position on the nature of freedom aﬀects one’s view on the possible value of
freedom; conversely, defenses of conceptions of freedom are often motivated by
particular moral presuppositions” 4. In addition, seeking the nature and the value
of freedom brought some other expansions in the literature. “For instance, dif-
ferences between theories of liberalism can partly be traced back to diﬀerences
between the implicit assumptions about the nature of freedom. By making these
assumptions explicit, the philosophical analysis of freedom has led to a better
understanding of the nature of theories of liberalism. Moreover, by subsequently
discussing the reasonableness of these assumptions, the philosophical analysis en-
ables us to make a more sophisticated assessment of the quality of conflicting
theories of liberalism” 5.
4For details see Gallie (1955/6)
5See Van Hees (2004)
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An important new approach to the study of freedom has evolved over the last
three decades. This approach is formal in nature and has its origin within the
realm of rational choice theory, which focuses on the formal analysis of processes
of individual and collective decision making, based on certain assumptions con-
cerning the rationality of such decision making. Amartya Sen was the first who
took “non-utility information” into account beside the traditional welfare axioms6.
With respect to the analysis of freedom, two new lines of formal research came
out.
The first new line was an examination of how considerations of freedom aﬀect
processes of collective decision-making. The main point of departure here is Sen’s
theorem of the impossibility of a Paretian liberal 7, or, as this result is also known,
the liberal paradox. Sen showed that a seemingly mild condition concerning the
liberty of individuals is incompatible with the well-known Pareto condition. “This
result supposedly established a fundamental tension between the protection of
individual freedom and rights on the one hand, and the quest for an optimum
level of collective welfare on the other” 8.
6By saying “non-utility information” we imply the considerations of freedom and equality.
For example, “minimal liberalization” condition of Sen is a kind of “non-utility information”.
For some of the Sen’s key contributions to the analysis of freedom, see Sen (1970, 1985a, 1985b,
1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1999, 2002).
7See Sen (1970)
8See Van Hees (2004)
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Sen’s result led to an enormous number of reactions. As with most impos-
sibility results, many of the initial reactions to the theorem consisted either of
establishing that the assumptions could be weakened so as to obtain an even
stronger impossibility result, or of examining whether there is a defensible weak-
ening of the assumptions that would lead to possibility results.9 With respect to
the latter question, Sen himself argued that the Pareto condition should be weak-
ened, thereby challenging one of the fundamental assumptions of the welfarist
framework used by economists. A diﬀerent type of reaction was launched by the
philosopher Robert Nozick 10, who argued that Sen’s approach was fundamentally
flawed since it used the wrong formal framework to analyze individual rights and
freedom. Sen described rights and freedom within the framework of social choice
theory, the part of rational choice theory that studies collective decision mecha-
nisms. However, as Nozick argued, it is more appropriate to understand rights as
forming the constraints within which collective decisions are made.
Beside the discussions about fundamental ways of escaping from the liberal
paradox, some game-theoretic approaches also emerged since game theory is the
part of rational choice theory that models the relationships between the possible
9For a review of this early literature, see Wriglesworth (1985).
10For details see Nozick (1974, p. 166)
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actions of individuals.11 Moreover, although the substance of Sen’s result - the
tension between freedom and Pareto optimality - remained uncontested and was
in fact thought to re-emerge in the game-theoretic framework, recent results show
that the desiderata may be compatible after all 12. Certain aspects of game theory
important here: game theory could explain why agents exercise their rights as
they do and, on a higher level of decision making, how the emergence of certain
allocations of rights can be explained.13
A second issue that was explored by rational choice theorists is the measure-
ment of freedom: determining the degree of freedom that individuals enjoy in
terms of the range of choices open to them. To get more information about “mea-
surement of freedom”, please look at Steiner (1983), Carter (1999), O’Neill (1980)
and Oppenheim (1981, 1995).
The rest of this work is going to be as fallowing: “The Impossibility of A
Paretian Liberal” is recalled in the next section. The solution attempts within
the context of the Sen’s original view are presented in Section III. In Section IV,
an alternative model that respects the liberty condition is constructed. Section V
11See Gärdenfors (1981), Deb (1990, 1994), Van Hees (1995, 1999), Deb et al. (1997), Fleur-
baey and Gaertner (1997), Gaertner et al. (1998); Peleg (1998), Fleurbaey and Van Hees (2000).
12For details please see Van Hees (1999, 2000b)
13See, among others, Suppes (1987), Sen (1988, 1990, 1991), Pattanaik and Xu (1990, 1997,
1998), Baird et al. (1994), Pattanaik and Suzumura (1996), Van Hees (1996, 2000a)
Klemisch-Ahlert (1993), Arrow (1995), Puppe (1995, 1996), Van Hees (1998, 2002a).
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makes some closing remarks.
2. Section II
2.1. The Impossibility of A Paretian Liberal
Overview The notion that Sen (1970b) tried to pay attention was whether
every alternative in a society should be “everyone’s business” or social aggregators
should protect some of the alternatives that are related to a particular subset of
the society. For example, suppose that there will be an election for the governor of
Istanbul. Is this the matter of the people who live in Istanbul or all the citizens of
Turkey including Ankara, Trabzon, and Kars.etc? It is very plausible to say that
people in Istanbul should elect the governor of the city. But, is this “privilege”
compatible with the other desired conditions of social aggregators? This kind
of choices lies in what is sometimes referred to as a group’s "protected sphere"
(see Hayek, 1960). Such spheres may be taken to be very wide or rather narrow
depending on, among other things, our political philosophy, but the existence
of some personal protected sphere seems to be widely acknowledged; see, for
example, Mill (1859), Hayek (1960) and Gramsci (1971), whose conceptions of
liberty diﬀer sharply in other respects. The trailblazing work of Amartya Sen, for
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which he received the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economic Science, strikes the tension
between the protection of individual freedom and Pareto optimality. The liberal
paradox of Sen showed that even a very mild description of liberty of individuals
is incompatible with the well-known Pareto condition.
Axioms In Sen’s original presentation of the impossibility of a Paretian liberal
the collective choice rule was required to satisfy the following three conditions:
CONDITION U (Unrestricted Domain): Every logically possible set of
individual orderings is included in the domain of the collective choice rule.14
Each individual can rank the alternatives in any desired transitive manner.
Recall, an individual’s ranking is transitive if and only if it obeys the ordering
properties of points on the line. For instance, if we prefer football to basketball
and basketball to volleyball, then surely we prefer football to volleyball; i.e., the
rankings a º b and b º c (meaning, a is at least as good as b, and b is at least as
good as c) imply a º c.
CONDITION P (Pareto Optimality): If every individual prefers any
alternative x to another alternative y, then society must prefer x to y.
14A collective choice rule is a functional relationship that specifies one and only one social
preference relation R for any set of n individual orderings (one ordering for each individual).
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CONDITION L (Liberalism): For each individual i ∈ N , there is at least
one pair of alternatives, say (x, y), such that if this individual prefers x to y, then
society should prefer x to y, and if this individual prefers y to x, then society
should prefer y to x.
Sen illustrates the intended meaning of this condition as following:
“Given other things in the society, if you prefer to have pink walls rather than
white, then [the] society should permit you to have this, even if a majority of
the community would like to see your walls white. Similarly, whether you should
sleep on your back or on your belly is a matter in which the society should permit
you absolute freedom, even if a majority of the community is nosey enough to feel
that you must sleep on your back.” 15
As Sen (1970b) mentioned, it is possible to weaken the condition of liberalism
further. Even though such freedom is considered as a privilege to a proper subset
of individuals, it may still very plausible to have a conflict in Sen’s world. To show
this minimal type freedom could cause a social conflict with Pareto eﬃciency, Sen
worked with a far weaker condition than Liberalism:
CONDITION L* (Minimal Liberalism): There are at least two indi-
15For details please see Sen (1970b, 152)
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viduals such that for each of them there is at least one pair of alternatives over
which he is decisive, that is, there is a pair of x, y, such that if he prefers x to y
(respectively y to x), then society should prefer x to y (respectively y to x).
Result According to Sen’s construction of collective choice rule and attached
meanings of alternatives ensure the following theorem to hold:
Theorem: There is no social decision function that can simultaneously satisfy
Conditions U, P, and L.16
In others words, given the condition of unrestricted domain, Pareto principle
and liberalism are incompatible. Since the Pareto principle has seldom been seri-
ously challenged as a reasonable requirement on social welfare judgments, there is
no wonder that Sen’s impossibility theorem to the eﬀect that there exists no col-
lective choice rule satisfying Sen’s minimal liberty as well as the Pareto principle
caused a stir. As Sen (1970b, 157) put it in his first paper on the impossibility
of a Paretian liberal, “the moral [of this impossibility theorem] is that in a very
basic sense liberal values conflict with the Pareto principle. . . . [I]f someone
16By social decision function Sen defines a collective choice rule which has a restricted range
to social preference relations that generate a choice rule. Therefore, “transitivity” condition is
not necessary for social decision functions.
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does have certain liberal values, then he may have to eschew his adherence to
Pareto optimality.” This is a criticism against the welfaristic basis of normative
economics indeed.
The original proof of the theorem is as following:
Let the two individuals referred to in Condition L* be 1 and 2, respectively,
and the two pairs of alternatives referred to be (x, y) and (z, w), respectively. If
(x, y) and (z, w) are the same pair of alternatives, then there is a contradiction.
They have, therefore, at most one alternative in common, say x = z. Assume now
that person 1 prefers x to y, and person 2 prefers w to z (= x). And let everyone
in the community including 1 and 2 prefer y to w. There is no inconsistency for
anyone, not even for 1 and 2, and their respective orderings are: 1 prefers x to y
and y to w, while 2 prefers y to w and w to x. By Condition U this should be
in the domain of the social decision mechanism. But by Condition L*, x must be
preferred to y, and w must be preferred to x (= z), while by the Pareto principle,
y must be preferred to w. Thus, there is no best element in the set (x = z, y, w)
in terms of social preference, and every alternative is worse than some other. A
choice function for the society does not therefore exist.
Next, let x, y, z, and w, be all distinct. Let 1 prefer x to y and 2 prefer z to
w. And let everyone in the community including 1 and 2 prefer w to x and y to
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z. There is no contradiction for 1 or 2, for 1 simply prefers w to x, x to y, and y
to z, while 2 prefers y to z, z to w, and w to x. By Condition U this configuration
of individual preferences must yield a social choice function. But by Condition
L* society should prefer x to y and z to w, while by the Pareto principle society
must prefer w to x, and y to z. This means that there is no best alternative for
this set, and a choice function does not exist for any set that includes these four
alternatives. Thus, there is no social decision function satisfying Conditions U, P,
and L* and the proof is complete.17
It may be helpful to illustrate this result by means of the case of Lady Chat-
terley’s Lover (LCL), also due to Sen 18. There is just one copy of this book and
two people, prude Mr. A and lascivious Mr. B. The admissible social states then
are:
x = “A reads LCL”,
y = “B reads LCL”, and
z = “neither of them reads LCL”.
The linear ordering of the preferences can (plausibly) be assumed as z over x
17Sen have a foot note at this point: “We can strengthen this theorem further by weakening
Condition L* by demanding only that 1 be decisive for x against y, but not vice versa, and 2 be
decisive for z against w, but not vice versa, and require that x 6= z, and y 6= w. This condition,
too, can be shown to be inconsistent with Condition U and P, but the logical gain involved in
this extension does not, alas, seem to be associated with any significant increase of relevance.”
18Sen (1970a; 1970b, pp. 80-81)
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over y for A, and x over y over z for B. For example, Sen describes the situation as
following: “Mr. A, who is a prude, prefers most that no one reads it, but given the
choice between either of the two reading it, he would prefer that he read it himself
rather than exposing gullible Mr. B to the influences of Lawrence (Prudes, I am
told, tend to prefer to be censors rather than being censored.) In decreasing order
of preference, his ranking is z, x, y. Mr. B, however, prefers that either of them
should read it rather than neither. Furthermore, he takes delight in the thought
that prudish Mr. A may have to read Lawrence, and his first preference is that
Mr. A should read it, next best that he himself should read it, and worst that
neither should. His ranking is, therefore, x, y, z”. Since reading or not reading
should, ceteris paribus, be a matter for individual discretion, we can easily justify
the assumptions that Mr. A has a right over (x,z) pair and Mr. B has a right
over (y,z) in the liberal context. Application of Condition P and Condition L then
immediately yields an acyclic social preference order.
This very simple but genius theorem had an enormous eﬀect on the literature
both in the social choice and philosophy context. It supposedly established a
fundamental tension between the protection of individual freedom and rights on
the one hand, and the quest for an optimum level of collective welfare on the other.
Sen’s result led to a very high number of reactions in the rational choice theory
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manner. As with most impossibility results, many of the initial reactions to the
theorem consisted either of establishing that the assumptions could be weakened
so as to obtain an even stronger impossibility result, or of examining whether there
is a defensible weakening of the assumptions that would lead to possibility results.
With respect to the latter question, Sen himself argued that the Pareto condition
should be weakened, thereby challenging one of the fundamental assumptions of
the welfarist framework used by economists.
3. Section III
3.1. Solution Attempts
"The Impossibility of A Paretian Liberal" followed by the many of related works,
e.g. Batra and Pattanaik (1972), Bernholz (1974, 1975), Blau (1975), Blau
and Deb (1976), Campbell (1975), Deb (1974), Farrell (1976), Fine (1975), Gib-
bard (1974), Hammond (1974), Hillinger and Lapham (1971), Karni (1974a, b),
Kelly (1976a, b), Ng (1971), Nozick (1973, 1974), Peacock and Rowley (1972),
Ramachandra (1972), Rowley and Peacock (1975), Seidl (1975) and Suzumura
(1976). While some authors have disputed the existence of the conflict, others
have investigated ways of escaping the diﬃculty, while still others have been con-
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cerned with extending this impossibility result to a wider class of social choice
problems. We can characterize the solution attempts for the Sen’s impossibility
result within the two main categories. The first one contains, as stated above,
the initial reactions of the paradox to weaken the one of the conditions U, P, L
or re-defining the liberalism in such a way that it would give some reasonable
possibility result. This work is mainly focus on these types of solution attempts.
Other solution attempts outside the original view of Sen’s Liberal context, e.g.
fuzzy preferences, are not subject of this study.
3.2. Weakening the Conditions Unrestricted Domain (U) and Pareto
Optimality (P)
3.2.1. Domain Restrictions
As mentioned above, one way of resolving the conflict is the weakening of Condi-
tion U, the "unrestricted domain" 19. However, the interpretation of a relaxation
of Condition U may not be obvious. Sen describes the situation as following 20:
“If a particular configuration of individual preferences is "outside
the domain" of a social decision procedure, then nothing can be de-
19See Sen, 1970a, pp. 85-86; Fine, 1975, and Blau, 1975
20See Sen, 1976
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duced from that procedure if such a configuration were to arise. When
we "rule out" a preference configuration, that is only a refusal to open
our mouth in that case, and obviously has no bearing on whether that
configuration will, in fact, arise or not. If such a preference configura-
tion does, in fact, occur, then to say that it is outside the domain of a
procedure is merely an admission of defeat as far as that procedure is
concerned. The relevance of the investigation of "domain restriction"
lays in the light it throws on the type of configurations that would have
to be absent. The investigation comes into its own when we move away
from the assumption of given individual preferences, and considers the
changes that will help to eliminate the conflict. It is in this context
that one can remark that "the eventual guarantee for individual free-
dom" may have to be found "in developing values and preferences that
respect each other’s privacy and personal choices" (Sen, 1970a, p. 85).
This is a "way out" of the dilemma only in this rather limited sense.
The belief that "unrestricted domain" is the condition to axe is not
uncommon, though the argument on this is rarely spelt out clearly.”
Blau (1975) told the story from a diﬀerent perspective. He pointed out that,
in the two-person case, the conflict between the Pareto principle and Condition L
17
arises only if both persons are meddlesome in the sense of having stronger pref-
erences against the other on the other’s assigned pair than on his own assigned
pair. "That one of them might exhibit such a preference is remarkable enough,
but that both should do so seems to border on the socially pathological" 21. Sen
also accepted this persuasive comment: “Whether pathological is an appropriate
description of this type of occurrence I find diﬃcult to decide, but as we saw with
several examples (e.g. the Lady Chatterley’s Lover case, the "work choice case",
the "Angelina-Edwin case"), such preference configurations may not be implau-
sible even over pairs the choices over which are regarded as "purely personal"
from the common libertarian point of view. If meddlesomeness is a disease, it is
certainly not a rare disease” 22.
Blau showed that the conflict between the Pareto principle and Condition L
would not arise in the case of two individuals and four alternatives, if only four
of the possible 752 configurations of individual preferences were to be ruled out
23. If any preference pattern were as likely as any other, this would give it a very
low probability of occurrence, even though for a large community there will be
a fair number of cases of conflict even under this assumption. But Sen criticizes
21See Blau, 1975, p. 396.
22Please see Sen (1976)
23See Blau, 1975, p. 398
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the equi-probability as a “not very good assumption” so that the interpretation
of Blau’s striking result remains a little problematic. According to Sen, Blau was
quite right in not basing his "way out" of the inconsistency on the relaxation of
the condition of "unrestricted domain", but on weakening the other conditions,
specifying what "should" be done if such a meddlesome preference configuration
were to arise. But he also adds, it was argued earlier that Blau’s solution was not
quite adequate, but their diﬀerences there do not lie in the role of the condition
of unrestricted domain.
Breyer (1977) proposed to restrict condition U. In order to avoid the liberal
paradox, he excluded all preference profiles that contain more than one individual
ordering Ri that is not "extremely liberal" (i.e. such that an individual’s per-
sonal alternatives are of overwhelming importance for him). But Gaertner and
Krüger (1981) criticize this type approaches: “To demand that n-1 individuals
are extremely liberal is a very severe requirement indeed. As long as such restric-
tions are dictated by the purpose they are to serve (viz., to reconcile Paretian and
libertarian principles) but have no independent justification (say, owing to em-
pirical findings that some preference profiles are not expected to occur), it seems
to us that Sen is right in saying that domain restrictions are something like an
19
"admission of defeat"24.”
It is very clear that no settlement has been agreed on the domain restrictions
of the liberal paradox in the literature. Moreover, we can easily say that many
economic theorists still look doubtfully to some kind of domain restrictions (like
the restrictions which only purposes to solve the well-known impossibility results).
3.2.2. Condition P: Re-Defining Pareto Condition in the Liberal Con-
text
One of the central conditions of the social choice theory is obviously Pareto prin-
ciple. In fact, the importance of Pareto principle stressed, by many authors, in
diﬀerent works. In addition, many papers also discussed the demands of this weak
condition. General view in the literature stands against to the attempts that try to
weaken the Pareto condition. For example Sen indicates “the suggestion that the
Pareto principle be rejected meets with resistance, which is perfectly understand-
able, since there is something very central in the idea that preferences unanimously
held by members of a community cannot be rejected by that community” 25. Also,
as Blau puts it, "I can see no case for an outside observer denying a unanimous
24See Sen (1976, p. 233)
25See Sen, 1976
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choice. This leads inevitably to modifying [Condition] L." 26. But there are also
some contrary ideas. In the context of social choice problems that permit for the
protected spheres, impossibility result brought a serious questioning of the Pareto
principle. People may agree on a particular ranking for quite diﬀerent reasons (as
in preferring x to y in the "Lady Chatterley" illustration), and a mechanical use
of the Pareto rule irrespective of context seems questionable.
If in a particular case of conflict with Pareto, rights are deemed more desirable,
then the Pareto condition should be weakened and made consistent with rights and
no further modification to the libertarian condition should be necessary. Farrell
(1976), Sen (1976), Suzumura (1978), Hammond (1980) and Austen-Smith (1982)
have all resolved the Sen Paradox in this way with various weakening of the
Pareto condition. And inversely, if social eﬃciency is deemed more desirable,
then rights should be re-defined so that they must respect the society’s interests.
Blau (1975), Gibbard (1974), Hillinger and Lapham (1971), Karni (1974a), and
Kelly (1976b) have tried to resolve the conflict by weakening Condition L rather
than by weakening the Pareto principle.
Gaertner and Krüger find the solution attempts, via weakening the Pareto
condition, interesting and quite successful, but not satisfactory. According to
26See Blau, 1975, p. 401
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them, this is mainly due to the following reasons. As long as the formal framework
(i.e., the set of individual orderings) provides too little information on the motives
behind each person’s preferences, their evaluation remains a gratuitous piece of
informal interpretation. (For an example of the arbitrariness of interpretation
compare the two readings of the Angelina-Edwin case in Gibbard (1974, p. 398)
and Sen (1976, p. 226)) They do not disagree with the idea of incorporating
motives into the formal theory and of classifying them as to their acceptability
in certain specific cases; they do not see, however, how this programme could be
carried out in its full generality27.
3.2.3. Weakening Condition L: Digressing the Liberalism
It is diﬃcult to define what liberty means. One of the most fundamental questions
raised in this context is related to the formulation of the concept of libertarian
rights by Sen. It has been contended by Nozick (1974), Bernholz (1974), Gar-
denfors (1981) and Sugden (1981), among others, that this formulation does not
capture intuitive notion of rights 28. In an important paper, Sen (1983) responded
to some of these criticisms. This, however, led to further debates 29.
27For attempts in this direction see Sen (1974, 1977)
28See also Gibbard, 1982
29See Sugden, 1985
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One of the earliest critiques of Sen’s formulation of individual rights came
from Nozick (1974). According to him, “. . . individual rights are co-possible; each
person may exercise his rights as he chooses. The exercise of these rights fixes
some features of the world. Within the constraints of these fixed features, a
choice can be made by a social choice mechanism based on a social ordering 30”.
Nozick visualizes the right of an individual in terms of the individual’s freedom
to choose from among several available options relating to some specific aspect
of the social states, and the constraints on social choice are imposed when the
individual, exercising his right, does choose one of the options 31.
Nozick was not the only one who criticizes liberty definition of Sen. Blau (1975)
examined the rights from a diﬀerent perspective which bases on the “intensity
of preference”. It works by comparing the intensity of a person’s preference for
choices on his own assigned pair vis-à-vis the same person’s intensity of preferences
for choices on someone else’s assigned pair:
Ordinal intensity: If a person prefers x to a, a to b and b to y, then his
preference for x over y is stronger than his preference for a over b. Furthermore,
this is so even if he is indiﬀerent between x and a, or between b and y, but not
30Nozick (1974, p. 166)
31For detailed discussion see Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura, 1992
23
both.
A person is "meddlesome" according to Blau if and only if his preference over
the two alternatives in his own assigned pair is weaker than his opposition to
someone else’s preference over that person’s assigned pair.
Blau tried to solve the impossibility by using a “modified liberalism” which
makes the libertarian rights conditional on preferences being non-meddlesome
32. Under various alternative versions of his "modified liberalism", the liberal
privileges are withheld
(a) for all if everyone’s preference is meddlesome (SL’),
(b) for all if someone’s preference is meddlesome (WL’), and
(c) for those whose preferences are meddlesome (L’).
He felt that a right should be withheld from an individual whenever he felt
more strongly about another person’s private alternatives than about his own.
This is an interesting concept; the trouble, however, is that with his notion of
meddlesomeness, Blau could provide a solution only for societies of no more than
two people. For three or more individuals he again obtained an impossibility
result. In addition, Sen suggests that their points of views are totally diﬀerent
with Blau:
32See Blau, 1975
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“Our diﬀerence does not lie in our respective recognitions of the role
of independence, but on precisely how to bring in "non-independent"
considerations into the decision. Blau would like to sacrifice personal
right (based on independence), retaining Pareto (also based on inde-
pendence), and whereas it appears that in many circumstances being
prepared to go against the Pareto principle is at least as reasonable.
An alternative will be to follow approach (a) above, which will remove
the sanctity of both the Pareto principle as well as of liberal privileges
when preferences are "meddlesome" in the sense of Blau33.”
Moreover, according to Gaertner and Krüger, the main reason for limited range
of Blau’s solution lies in the fact that the meddlesomeness definition of Blau. It is
constructed so that Blau’s notion of nosiness applies only to rather special cases;
it does not, for example, cover pairs of strict preferences that are not nested within
each other (cf. the profile that Blau used in his inconsistency theorem for more
than two persons). They advise that, in order to be more successful, one obviously
33According to Sen, we might decide to follow one of the following three alternative ways of
discounting meddlesome preference ordering:
a) ignore his entire ordering;
b) ignore his ordering of non-self-regarding pairs;
c) ignore his ordering of the self-regarding pair.
Sen is implying “ignoring entire ordering” of meddlesome preference by saying “to follow
approach (a) above”. For a detailed analysis please see Sen, 1976 p.222
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has to introduce some stronger restriction of condition L 34.
Blau’s "modified liberalism" is an example of libertarian rights being treated
as alienable. But, Gibbard (1974) was the first successfully to modify L by making
individual rights alienable under certain circumstances 35. Following to his paper,
a rights system is a set of ordered triples {x, y, k} where {x, y} is assigned to
person k. Under ordinary circumstances person k has an absolute right over to
determine the ranking between x and y, in the sense that, if he prefers x to y,
then x is judged socially better than y. But this right can be waived if others
beside k "claim their rights" to z over x, and person k himself regards y at least
as good as z. Others can claim their rights to z over x if and only if there is a
sequence of strict preferences: z over a1, a1 over a2,. . . , am-1 over am and am over
x, such that the ranking over each pair is derived either from Pareto preference or
from the preference of someone other than k to whom the relevant pair has been
assigned under the rights system. This weakening of the libertarian requirements
makes it consistent with the Pareto principle for a social decision function with
unrestricted domain. Gibbard proceeds to show that these alienable rights are
34For a detailed discussion see Gaertner and Krüger, 1981
35Gibbard (1974), and following him many other authors, have formalized rights in terms of
issues. See for example Breyer (1977), Suzumura (1978), Kelly (1978), Hammond (1980) and
Gaertner and Krüger (1981, 1982).
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waived only under very special circumstances 36.
But Gibbard’s ingenious right system construction is also subject to a similar
criticism of Sen about Blau:
“The ethical interpretation of the Gibbard system of alienable
rights appears to be open to the same type of criticism as Blau’s
"modified liberalism". When meddling in each other’s aﬀairs causes
a cycle involving the Pareto principle and personal rights, the axe in
the Gibbard system falls invariably on personal rights (based on the
"self-regarding" part of a person’s preference), leaving intact the ef-
fectiveness of the Pareto rule (based on the "non-self-regarding" parts
of people’s preferences).”
Also Greatner and Krüger blame the Gibbard’s procedure for making the
recognition of rights depend on the total preference profile of society, which de-
tracts too much from their character of being genuine rights. Furthermore, ac-
cording to them, his solution is ad hoc in the sense that it is explicitly devised for,
and only for, avoiding the social preference cycles of Sen’s paradox. Karni (1978)
has also support the criticisms of Greatner and Krüger by showing that Gibbard’s
36For formal statements, see Gibbard, 1974
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rights’ system is such that one individual, by manipulating his own preference
ordering, can achieve that the right of another person is waived.
The fundamental question within all of these debates is whether individual
preference ordering solely enough for determining the social outcome or some de-
scriptive motivations behind the preferences should be examined. Since the basic
intention of this work is to look Sen’s world from social choice theory perspective
we are not going to look into the deeper analysis of this question. In the social
choice manner there also exists some other questions. For example, is the Sen’s
original definition of liberalism an obstacle to solve impossibility? From this point
of view we can conclude that while Blau’s and Gibbard’s methods consist of ac-
cepting the basic idea behind Condition L but qualifying its scope in terms of
preferences over other pairs. However, some other authors have proposed ways of
avoiding the dilemma by declaring Condition L to be essentially inappropriate.
4. Section IV
4.1. Alternative Model
In this part, Sen’s Liberal Paradox is examined from a diﬀerent angle. If we have
more information about alternatives, what would be the consequences? Could we
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find a way to get a possibility result? This chapter mainly tries to answer these
questions. Suppose that we have a Relevance System which gives us the relation-
ship between alternatives and individuals. Intuitively, relevance system gives us
which alternatives are whose "own business". Formally, a relevance system is a
function which assigns a group of people for every alternative. Our concern is
whether this information useful or not. Fortunately, the answer is "yes" in the
Liberalism context. We will name the model that is constructed in this chapter
as "alternative model". In order to construct the alternative model, first we will
give basic notions and axioms, after that we will show the results.
4.1.1. Basic Notions
Let N = 1, 2, ..., n be the finite number of individuals.
Let X = {x, y, z..} be the finite number of alternatives.
Linear preference of an individual i is shown by Ri. Also, R corresponds to
preference profile as in standard literature37.
A collective choice rule is a functional relationship that specifies one and
only one social preference relation R for any set of n individual orderings (one
37Note that we use only linear preferences in this work. By this it is meant that individual
preferences are complete and transitive binary relations.
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ordering for each individual).
A social decision function α(R) is a collective choice rule, the range of
which is restricted to social preference relations that generate a choice function.
We call a set Ai is "at least as good as" Aj (or Ai < Aj) for α(R) iﬀ38
(i) CASE I : s(Ai) = s(Aj)
s({x ∈ Ai : ∃y ∈ Aj s.t. x α(R) y}) ≥ s({x ∈ Ai : ∃y ∈ Aj s.t. y α(R) x})
(ii) CASE II : s(Ai) 6= s(Aj) (WLOG assume s(Ai) < s(Aj))
s({Aji ⊆ Aj ⊆ X : s(Aji) = s(Ai) and Ai < Aji})
≥
s({Aji ⊆ Aj ⊆ X : s(Aji) = s(Ai) and Aji < Ai})
A binary relation over sets, <, is complete iﬀ ∀Ai, Aj ⊆ X either Ai < Aj or
Aj < Ai holds.
A binary relation over sets, <, is transitive iﬀ ∀Ai, Aj, Ak ⊆ X,
Ai < Aj and Aj < Ak ⇒ Ai < Ak
38s(Ai) : cardinality of Ai
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A relevance system is a function such that, for every given alternative it
assigns a group of individuals who is related to that alternative.
RS(x) : X −→ 2N \ {∅}
Definition of relevance system is very close to the definition of rights-system
of Gibbard (1974)39. However, the diﬀerence between right system and relevance
system notions plays quite important role in this model. First of all, relevance sys-
tem definition is more restrictive then Gibbard’s rights-system. Hence, Gibbard’s
construction of right system represents more general class of relevance systems.
But relevance system seperates the alternative set into partitions and does not
allow power conflicts or paradoxial right distributions over sets (or pairs) of alter-
natives. Therefore, relevance system allows us to construct a model where decision
power within and between partitions are seperated.
We call a set of alternatives is a relation group iﬀ for every alternative in
the set there is a unique group of people given by the relevance system.
Ak = {x ∈ X : RS(x) = RS(k)}
39Gibbard defined rights-system as an assignment of ordered pairs of alternatives to individu-
als. Note that Gibbard’s rights-system is defined over pairs but relevance system is defined over
singletons.
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An adjustment function h(α(R)) for social decision function α(R) con-
sist of following steps:
1. Apply social decision function α(R) for a given preference profile R
2. Use the relevance system and determine which subset of alternatives is
related to which group of people
3. By using information in steps (1) and (2) find the inter-set ranking over
the subsets of alternatives (which are the partitions of X)
4.By using social decision function α(R) over the subsets of alternatives and
the people who are related to those subsets of alternatives determine the intra-set
ranking
5.By combining (3) and (4) get the adjusted social ranking
4.1.2. Axioms
CONDITION U (Unrestricted Domain): Every logically possible set of in-
dividual orderings is included in the domain of the collective choice rule. In this
alternative model unrestricted domain is assumed unless another domain restric-
tion stated explicitly.
CONDITION LPO (Local Pareto Optimum): If every individual who
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has decision power over the same relation group, prefers any alternative x to
another alternative y in that relation group, then society must prefer x to y.
CONDITION L (Liberalism): If alternatives x and y are only business
of the people in the set S then their decision over (x, y) determines the social
decision over (x, y).
At this point, it is also useful to remember Sen’s original definitions of Pareto
Optimality and Minimal Liberalism.
CONDITION PO (Pareto Optimum): If every individual prefers any
alternative x to another alternative y, then society must prefer x to y.
CONDITION ML (Minimal Liberalism): There are at least two indi-
viduals such that for each of them there is at least one pair of alternatives over
which he is decisive, that is, there is a pair of x, y, such that if he prefers x (re-
spectively y) to y (respectively x), then society should prefer x (respectively y) to
y (respectively x).
Note that, if every person has a decision power on every alternative then LPO
and PO are same. Also, if S in the definition of L is a singleton set and there are
at least two diﬀerent such sets then L and ML are same.
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4.1.3. Results
Lemma 1. For a given relevance system, if a social decision function α(R) is PO
then adjustment function, h(α(R)), of α(R) satisfies the conditions LPO and L.
Proof:
Take any social decision function α(R) which satisfies PO.
First, we will show that adjustment function, h(α(R)), of α(R) is LPO. Take
any R¯ ∈ < such that x R¯i y ∀i ∈ N . Then, x α(R¯) y by PO. Since LPO just
considers the alternatives which are in the same relation group, let’s consider the
alternatives x and y such that RS(x) = RS(y) = S. Then, x R¯i y ∀i ∈ S since
S ⊆ N . Furthermore, h(α(R)) determines it’s intra-set ranking by using α(R).
Therefore, we have x h(α(R¯)) y. Hence, h(α(R)) is LPO.
Now, we will show that adjustment function, h(α(R)), of α(R) satisfies the
condition L. Suppose adjusted social ordering is not Liberal. Then ∃ a preference
profile Rˆ, a pair of alternatives (x, y) and a group of people S ⊆ N such that
RS(x) = RS(y) = S and x α(Rˆs) y (where α(Rˆs) shows the social decision
resticted to people S)but y h(α(Rˆ)) x. Note that, if RS(x) = RS(y) = S then
people in S are decisive over (x, y). Since construction of adjustment function
h(α(R)) respect decisiveness of groups, x α(Rˆs) y implies x h(α(Rˆ)) y. Therefore
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we have a contradiction. Hence, h(α(Rˆ)) is Liberal. ¥
Theorem 2. Given any relevance system, there exists a social decision function
which satisfies LPO and L
Proof: Just name the adjustment function, h(α(R)), as social decision function.¥
As it is mentioned before, if everyone is related to every alternative than LPO
implies PO. Also, if S in the definition of L is a singleton set and there are at
least two diﬀerent such sets then L and ML are same. But why do we have this
possibility result? What is diﬀerent then Sen’s Liberal Context? It is not hard to
see the answer. We have two particular cases which are interesting:
1. All alternatives are relevant for all people. In this case LPO implies PO.
2. x and y are relevant for set of individuals S, w and z are relevant for set of
individuals T . In this case, if S and T are singletons then L implies ML.
Obviously, these two cases can not hold simultaneously unless S = T = N . In
case 1 every alternative is related to everyone. Since there are no local decisions;
Local Pareto Optimum and Pareto Optimum conditions are same. And note that,
in this case every social decision function satisfies Liberalism condition. Therefore,
in this case every social decision function which satisfies Pareto condition will be
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Liberal also. Actually, even only this case shows that Sen’s impossibility result
mainly due to lack of information about alternatives. In case 2, situation is a bit
more complicated. Since in this case L implies ML, by Sen’s result we know that
there exists no social decision function which is PO and ML. But we can still find
a social decision function which is LPO and L. The intuition is simple. In this
case LPO implies L. Consequently, we have this possibility result. Even though it
might be argued that LPO is a very strong condition, this result still important
since it shows the importance of the description of alternatives in the Liberalism
context.
Under these considerations, Sen’s impossibility result is due to desperate inves-
tigation of social decision function which works under both situations described
above. If Pareto Optimality is more desirable condition for society then relevance
system should put us into the first case, but if Liberalism is better for society then
we should be in the second case. If we want both, then there is no such alternative
description.
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5. Section V
5.1. Conclusions
Individual desire’s conflict with social eﬃciency was a very popular topic during
1970s. After Amartya Sen’s pioneering work of "The Impossibility of A Paretian
Liberal", an enormous number of papers published on diﬀerent aspects of this
conflict. This study mainly describes how various authors contributed to this
literature and tries to incorporate the importance of "description" in individual
oriented problems of Social Choice Theory. The alternative model developed in
Section III shows that more information about the nature of alternatives allows
us to find a way out from the conflict between social and individual decisions.
It should be noted that alternative result does not say anything about fairness.
Further researches in this literature might focus on fairness issue more since the
fundamental question lies on how to protect the individuals’ rights. We need to
think more about the protection of global rights that every human-being should
have under local decision powers.
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